The cyber world is plagued with ever-evolving malware that readily infiltrate all defense mechanisms, operate viciously unbeknownst to the user, and surreptitiously exfiltrate sensitive data. Understanding the inner workings of such malware provides a leverage to effectively combat them. This understanding is pursued often through dynamic analysis which is conducted manually or automatically. Malware authors accordingly, have devised and advanced evasion techniques to thwart or evade these analyses. In this article, we present a comprehensive survey on malware dynamic analysis evasion techniques. In addition, we propose a detailed classification of these techniques and further demonstrate how their efficacy holds against different types of detection and analysis approaches.
INTRODUCTION
Gaining access through ARPANET network, Creeper copied itself remotely to other computers, and, prompted the message: "Catch me if you can." Emerged as an experiment in 1971 [23] , Creeper carried no harmful purpose, yet, with its quick propagation it cast the light on a future with individuals or entities incorporating their malicious intentions into a software (hence the name malware), Our contributions are as follows:
-We present a comprehensive survey of malware dynamic analysis evasion techniques for both modes of manual and automated. In [21] , authors have conducted a comprehensive analysis on dynamic analysis evasion on different platforms. However, their focus is on automated dynamic analysis and the discussion of manual dynamic analysis evasion is rather brief. Other surveys like [43, 81] trivially surveyed analysis evasion and provide no detailed overview of malware dynamic analysis evasion. -For both manual and automated modes, we present a detailed classification of malware evasion tactics and techniques. To the best of our knowledge, this would be the first comprehensive survey of dynamic analysis evasion tactics that offers a thorough classification. -We portray the current trends in the realm of automated dynamic analysis evasion techniques and discuss the proper course of action for future directions. -We provide a brief survey on countermeasures against evasive malware that the industry and academia is pursuing. In addition, we yield a classification for such endeavors.
1.1 Overview 1.1.1 Scope. Latest reports attest to the dominance of Windows malware by a staggering ratio of 77.22% in 2017 [5] . Statistics also show that due to the employment of evasion techniques, "64% of AV scanners fail to identify 1% of the malware after 1 year [67] ." These figures have further motivated us to converge our focus on evasive malware targeting Windows OS. Moreover, in our research, we have striven to probe the intersection of academia and industry. Thus, we have reviewed both academic papers, and related industry-provided literature.
Approach.
Our primary endeavor has been to provide a detailed and vivid overview of dynamic analysis evasion techniques. To this end, we have classified the results of our scrutiny in three levels: category, tactic, and technique. Each category represents a particular approach and a goal which is both shared and pursued through different tactics. Each tactic then is implemented via different techniques. Throughout the survey, we elaborate the details down to the tactic level and we discuss several representative techniques. At the end of each section, we provide a summarizing table.
Evaluation.
To fulfill the goals of this survey, we have employed several criteria such as efficacy and pervasiveness of different techniques which serve as the basis of comparisons for the related topic. In our summarizing tables, we present data from reviewed works where statistics are available, and otherwise, we offer evaluations based on our own observation.
Organization.
In Section 2, we discuss manual dynamic analysis (debugging) and corresponding anti-debugging tactics. In Section 3, we discuss the automated dynamic analysis and the corresponding evasion tactics. Sections 2 and 3 are followed by a discussion. Finally, Section 4 concludes the article. Figure 1 demonstrates our proposed classification of the malware dynamic analysis evasion tactics.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we define several keywords that we extensively use throughout the article. Some terms, specifically, we deemed to need explanation since the passage of time has overloaded or altered their pervasive meaning.
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Sandbox
Traditionally, sandbox was developed to contain unintended effects of an unknown software [46] . Hence, the term sandbox meant an isolated or highly controlled environment used to test unverified programs. Due to similarities in nature, virtualized machines and emulated environments are often seen to be called sandbox. But, in this article, we use the term sandbox to refer to the contained and isolated environments that analyze the given program automatically, without the involvement of a human. The dividing line for us, in this article, given the trend of the industry, is the autonomous nature of the system. For instance, for a modified virtualized machine such as Ether, we consider the term debugger rather than sandbox.
Evasion and Transparency
In literature, evasion constitutes a series of techniques employed by malware in order to remain stealth, avoid detection, or hinder efforts for analysis. For instance, a major evasion tactic as we will discuss is fingerprinting [103] . With fingerprinting, the malware tries to detect its environment and verify if it is residing in a production system or an analysis system. In the same level, one major strategy to counter the evasions is to hide the cues and clues that might expose the analysis system. A system is more transparent if it exposes fewer clues to malware [66] .
Manual vs. Automated
Manual and automated analysis are two major terms which form the basis of our classifications. The manual analysis is when the analysis process is performed by an expert human with the help of a debugger. If a technique uses the traditional sandboxing technology to implement a transparent debugger, we consider them under the manual dynamic analysis evasion. Automated, on the other hand, is the process that is the similar analysis that is performed automatically by a machine or software, also known as sandbox.
Detection vs. Analysis
Previously, there was no need for defining these two terms. Detection would simply refer to the process of discerning whether a given file is malicious or not; analysis, on the other hand, would refer to the process of understanding how the given malware works. Today, however, this dividing line is blurry. The reason is that the role of automated analysis tools such as sandboxes is now extended. In addition to reporting on malware behavior, sandboxes are now playing their role as the core of automated detection mechanisms [66] . In this article, we follow similar concepts when uttering analysis. For manual it would mean understanding the malware behavior [121] ; for the automated, additionally, it can mean detection.
Static vs. Dynamic
There are two major types of analysis, i.e., static and dynamic. Static analysis is the process of analyzing the code or binary without executing it. Dynamic analysis is the process of studying the behavior of the malware (API, system calls, etc.) at the runtime. Both types of analysis can be performed either manually or automatically. In this article, our focus is on dynamic analysis and how malware tries to prevent or evade such analysis.
Category, Tactic, and Technique
Throughout this article, we use the terms category, tactic, and technique that are the basis of our classification. The category of evasion is our high-level classification. Each category has the goal of evasion with a specific attitude for achieving it. This attitude is highly correlated with the efficacy of the evasion and is pursued by the tactics under each category. Tactics, in other words, are the specific maneuvers or approach for evasion with the specified attitude of its parent category. Finally, techniques are the various practical ways of implementing those tactics.
MANUAL DYNAMIC ANALYSIS EVASION
As cited in the Introduction, due to the employment of code obfuscation, packers, and so forth, static analysis of malware has become a daunting task. To obviate the conundrums and limitations of this approach, analysts opt for dynamic analysis in which malware's behavior is inspected at the runtime and often with the help of debuggers. This way of examination has two major benefits; one is that it relieves us from the impediments inflicted by packers, polymorphism, and so forth Second, taking this approach enables us to explore the activities that manifest themselves only in runtime [110] such as the interaction of the program with the OS [97] . We view this approach which is aided by debuggers, under the term "manual dynamic analysis." The corresponding evasion tactics to this approach involve the set of employed techniques within malware code with the goal of hindering, impeding, or evading the analysis process. These measures include approaches such as detecting the presence of analysis tools on the system (e.g., Wireshark, TCPDump) or detecting virtual machines as a sign of analysis environment, but, the majority of manual analysis evasion techniques are targeted toward debuggers, which are the primary tools of manual dynamic analysis. Chen et al. ran a study on 6,222 malware samples to assess changes in malware behavior in the presence of virtualization or an environment with debuggers attached. They discovered in the presence of a debugger (not in a virtualized environment) around 40% of malware samples exhibited less malicious behavior [24] . The same study revealed that when malware are executed in a virtualized environment, merely 2% of the samples exhibit malicious behavior. This shows that even though there are similar tactics to evade both the automated and manual dynamic analysis, e.g., fingerprinting, the techniques are different. And sheer detection of virtualization or emulated environment does not suffice to evade manual analysis since more and more production systems are running on virtualized machines. Our coverage in this section includes the traditional (and still relevant) anti-debugging techniques to the more advanced, recent AI-powered techniques.
Simply, anti-debugging is the application of one or more techniques, to fend off, impede, or evade the process of manual dynamic analysis (debugging) or reverse-engineering. It is noteworthy to mention that anti-debugging techniques, similar to obfuscation, initially, were legitimate practices conducted by developers to protect their software. This implies that anti-debugging has a long history which is followed by a wide and diverse set of techniques. In this section, we will present our survey on the most cited manual dynamic analysis evasion (anti-debugging) tactics and corresponding techniques [3, 17, 24, 36, 40, 97, 110, 121, 131, 143, 148] that are more relevant to the context of malware. In addition, for each technique, we employ four criteria to better yield an overview of their relative weight and efficacy. The four criteria for our comparison and our touchstone for evaluating them are as follows:
-Complexity: The difficulty of incorporating and implementing the technique within malware code. We associate low complexity if the technique involves simple API calls for detection of debuggers' presence, medium to those that require several calls to inquire information from the system as well and the need to deduce from the returned information the probability of debuggers presence, and high to those that are challenging to implement and require more than 30 lines of assembly code. -Resistance: Resistance pertains to the difficulty level of counteracting the evasion technique. If it would be as simple as altering some system information (e.g., randomizing registry key or a bit in PEB) we consider it low; if defeating the anti-debugging technique requires user-level hook and dll injection, we assign medium resistance; if kernel-level manipulations, e.g., drivers, are needed we set the resistance level as high; and if the countermeasure requires operations below OS (virtualization, emulation, etc.) we consider it very high. Finally, we have N/A, associated with techniques for which there exist no countermeasures yet. -Pervasiveness: Due to the extreme diversity of the malware sample dataset it is hard to establish a ground truth for the pervasiveness of each tactic. However, we strive to provide a fair view of this metric based on other works [17, 119] in addition to our own observations and experience in the field. -Efficacy-Level: Implementation of a debugger can take different architectural paths, e.g., user-level, kernel-level, virtualization-based, and more recently, bare-metal. Under the efficacy-level criterion, we will note against which architecture of debugger the evasion tactic is effective. For the sake of brevity, we appoint 1 to refer to user-level debuggers, 2 to refer to kernel-level debuggers, 3 to refer to virtualization-based/emulation-based debuggers, and 4 to refer to bare-metal debuggers.
Additionally, we allot a column to Countermeasure under which we briefly note how the antidebugging technique could be circumvented. We summarize our manual dynamic analysis evasion study in Table 1 . Before scrutinizing the anti-debugging techniques, we will have a brief introduction on debuggers, their goals, types, and techniques. Building upon this understanding, we can better understand and elaborate anti-debugging tactics and what makes them feasible.
A Briefing on Debuggers
As Sikorski states, "A debugger is a piece of software or hardware used to test or examine the execution of another program [121] ." Among the core functionality of debuggers [1] , there are several features that are critical to malware analysis such as stepping through the code one instruction at a time, pausing or halting it on desired points, examining the variables, and so forth. To provide each of the mentioned functionalities, debuggers rely on different tactics and each tactic is often aided with specific hardware or software provisions that inevitably result in subtle changes on the system. For instance, to provide the pausing capability, one of the debuggers' tactics is to set breakpoints. Using breakpoints is further assisted with either special hardware [26] (e.g., DR Registers of CPU and specific API to access/alter them), or software (e.g., specific opcodes) [98] mechanisms. Single stepping, as another instance, is made possible by triggering exceptions in the code which is aided by a specific flag (trap flag). One way malware can discover the presence of the debugger is through the very same aiding mechanisms or results of corresponding changes on the system, which we will elaborate more as we proceed.
Based on the needed functionality, debuggers are implemented following different approaches [42] , including user-mode debuggers (e.g., OllyICE, OllyDbg), kernel debuggers (e.g., WinDbg, KD), virtualization-based debuggers (e.g., Ether [31] , BOCHS, [70] , HyperDBG [38] ), and more recently, the bare-metal debuggers such as MALT [148] . Each of the designs yields different levels of transparency. Kernel-level debuggers are more transparent than user-level debugger and provide more detailed information as they operate in ring 0 (same level of privilege as the OS). Virtualization/emulation-based debuggers have an even higher level of privilege than kernel debuggers since the OS in this setting is running atop the simulated (virtualized/emulated) hardware [31, 70] and consequently are more transparent to malware. Finally, the bare-metal designs such as MALT, which often rely on System Management Mode (SMM), offers the highest level of transparency against which many of the traditional anti-debugging techniques lose efficacy. In the next section, we proceed to manual dynamic analysis evasion, or more specifically, anti-debugging tactics.
Proposed Anti-Debugging Classification
We propose two major categories as malware's initial anti-debugging strategies, which are similar to the categories of automated analysis evasion: detection-dependent and detection-independent. We elaborate on each category down to the tactic level along with several representative techniques for each tactic. Table 1 captures a summary of our study on manual dynamic analysis evasion.
Detection-Dependent.
We call the tactics of this category as detection-dependent in that the malware probes for detecting its environment in order to escape analysis. Put differently, a successful evasion is subjected to detecting or finding signs of an analysis environment. One of malware's major leverages against debuggers stems from the fact that debuggers were originally devised to debug legitimate software [110] . Thus, initially, there has been no stealthy countermeasure provisioned by them. Moreover, when we want to enable debugging capability, we often have to instrument the system with necessary tools which obviously results in a wide spectrum of traces in different levels of the system [24, 119] . Examining the system for such traces that are inherent to working principles of debuggers is one major strategy that malware utilizes to detect the presence of a debugger. In this section, we will elaborate on these system changes and how malware might try to disclose them. We would also briefly note how the defenders might try to counter such tactics. Tactic 1. Fingerprinting. Fingerprinting is the malware's endeavor to spot, find, or detect signs that attest to the presence of an analysis environment or debuggers. Fingerprinting is the most common evasion tactic regarding both manual and automated analysis. However, the techniques are different. In contrast with the automated analysis evasion, the majority of fingerprinting techniques aimed at evading manual analysis involve fingerprinting the environment to detect the presence of debuggers [24] . Major fingerprinting techniques used by malware include the following:
-Analyzing Process Environment Block (PEB). PEB is a data structure that exists per process in the system and contains data about that process [90] . Different sections of PEB contain information that can be probed by malware to detect whether a debugger exists. The most obvious one is a field inside PEB named BeingDebugged which can be read directly or as Microsoft recommends-and malware like Kronos [52] or Satan RaaS [129] implementthrough the specific APIs that read this field, i.e., IsDebuggerPresent(), CheckRemoteDebug-gerPresent(). Implementation of this technique is of trivial complexity which can be countered through alteration of BeingDebugged bit [102] or API hook [3] . Collectively, antidebugging tactics relying on PEB constitute the majority of anti-debugging techniques observed in malware [17] . -Search for Breakpoints. To halt the execution, debuggers set breakpoints. This can be accomplished through hardware or software techniques. In hardware breakpoints, the breakpoint address, for instance, can be saved in CPU DR registers. In software breakpoints, the debugger writes the special opcode 0xCC (INT 3 instruction) into the process which is specifically designated for setting breakpoints. Consequently, the malware, if it spots signs of these breakpoints, presumes the presence of a debugger. This can be accomplished through a self-scan or integrity check, looking for 0xCC or using GetThreadContext to check CPU register [40] . The latter technique has been employed by malware such as CIH [82] or MyDoom [84] . This technique is the second most observed anti-debugging technique in malware's arsenal [17] and is simple to implement (less than 10 lines of assembly code often suffices).
Countering this category of tactics, however, is not trivial. In the case of software breakpoints, for instance, the debugger has to keep and feed a copy of the original byte that was replaced by 0xCC opcode [102] . -Probing For System Artifacts. From installation to configuration and execution, debuggers leave traces behind in different levels of the OS (e.g., in the file system, registry, process name). Hence, malware can simply look for these traces. FindWindow() and FindProcess() are a couple of APIs that shcndhss [57] exploited to detect debuggers. The malware, for instance, can give the name of debuggers as the parameter to FindWindow() to verify if its process exists on the system or not [120, 131] . Most often, simple anti-debugging techniques are defeated with trivial complexity. The countermeasure to this category of tactic is randomizing the names or altering the results of the aforementioned query through simple API hooks. Even though attributed to one of the anti-debugging techniques in literature, we have rarely observed it in the wild. A similar technique to note here is called parent check. Ordinarily, applications are executed either through double clicking of an icon, or execution from command line, the parent process ID of which is retrievable accordingly. It would be a pronounced sign of debugger if the examined parent process name belongs to a debugger or is not equivalent to the process name of explorer.exe [40] . One straightforward technique is using CreateToolhelp32Snapshot() and checking if the parent process name matches the name of a known debugger [3] . A malware such as [57] uses such a technique [17] . Countering this technique would be skipping the relevant APIs [119] . Our observations demonstrate few utilizations of this technique [17] . Another technique for fingerprinting for system artifacts is mining NtQuerySystemInformation. The ntdll NtQuerySystemInformation() is a function that accepts a parameter which is the class of information to query [40] . Defeating this technique requires patching the kernel. vti-rescan [134] , Wdf01000.sys [56] , and Inkasso trojaner [113] are some instances that leverage this technique. -Timing-Based Detection. Timing-based detection is among the most efficacious fingerprinting techniques for inferring a debugger's presence. Adroit employment of this technique reliably exposes the presence of a debugger and circumventing them is an arduous task. The logic behind this timing-based detection follows malware authors' presumption that a particular function or instruction set requires merely a minuscule amount of time. Thus, if a predefined threshold is surpassed, malware would infer the presence of a debugger or analysis environment. Timing-based detection can be carried out either locally with the aid of local APIs (GetTickCount(), QueryPerformanceCounter(), etc. [89] ) or CPU rdtsc (read timestamp counter), or can be performed by inquiring an external resource through the network [106] to conduct the timing. Local timing is simple to employ and difficult to circumvent. Countering timing-based detection conducted with the aid of an external resource (using NTP or tunneled NTP), however, is still an open problem [148] . W32/HIV [60], W32/MyDoom [84] , and W32/Ratos [86] are infamous malware that are known to have exploited the timing discrepancies.
Tactic 2. Traps. Not to be mistaken with the trap flags, we define this category of tactics as "traps." Following this tactic, the malware provisions codes that when traversed or stepped through by debugger, production of specific information or lack thereof would help the malware infer the presence of a debugger. These inferences mostly rely on exploiting the logic of the system (e.g., SEH Exception handling [91] ). Many techniques fit this category and we elaborate a couple of them here and hint at the rest in Table 1 .
One technique by which malware beguiles a debugger to disclose cues of its presence is using specific instructions and exploiting the logic of how these instructions are handled. The handling is performed through Structured Exception Handling (SEH). (You can refer to [91] for more information about SEH.) For instance, Max++ malware [54] embeds "int 2dh" instruction within its code. According to SEH, when this instruction is executed, in a normal situation, i.e., absence of debugger, an exception is raised and malware can handle it via a try-catch structure. However, if a debugger is attached, this exception will be transferred to the debugger rather than the malware; the absence of expected exception is the logic that the malware entertains to deduce the presence of a debugger. Malware may employ other techniques to lay their traps such as embedding specific instruction prefixes [131] , or other instructions such as 41h [40] . These techniques are of low complexity and can be implemented with less than 20 lines of code (in assembly). One way of countering these traps requires debuggers to skip these instructions. According to our survey, utilizing traps is a fairly common approach [17] .
Tactic 3. Debugger Specific.
Debugger specific evasion exploits vulnerabilities that are exclusive to a specific debugger. These vulnerabilities are difficult to discover, but simple to put into action. A famous instance pertains to OllyDBG [143] . Regular versions of this debugger have a format string bug which can be exploited to cause it to crash by passing an improper parameter to OutPutDebugString() function. Another pervasive-at-the-time technique was related to SoftICE debugger which was susceptible to multiple DoS attacks because of two vulnerable functions [39] . Malware like [19] that exploited these vulnerabilities would cause the bluescreen of death. SoftICE is no longer supported and the dll file that caused the vulnerability in OllyDBG is now fixed. But the idea still remains, if a vulnerability within a specific debugger is discovered, exploiting it would be a potent anti-debugging technique.
Tactic 4. Targeted. The last tactic of the detection-dependent category is targeted evasion. Through this tactic, the malware encrypts its malicious payload with a specific encryption key. This encryption key, however, is chosen to be an attribute or variable that could be found only on its target system. This key could be the serial number of a component in the target system, specific environment setting, and so forth. The targeted tactic is considered one of the most advanced analysis evasion tactics and it is effective against all kinds of debuggers from user mode to baremetal. Countering the targeted tactic inherently is an arduous task and we will discuss why as we proceed. Following are two techniques for using the targeted tactic.
-Environment Keying. With this technique, the malware author encrypts the payload with a key that is possible to derive merely from the target environment. This could be a specific string in the registry or the serial number of a specific device. Gauss [14] and Ebowla (a framework) [76] are instances that use this technique to prevent their payloads from being analyzed. An obvious way to counter this technique is brute-forcing the payload to come up with the Encryption Key. And depending on the encryption algorithm and key complexity, it might not be feasible. Another glimpse of hope for combating this technique is brought by path exploration techniques such as [20, 27, 95, 136] . But these techniques have their own limits and may not be effective all the time. In fact, they lose their efficacy when facing the next generation of AI-powered targeted techniques. -AI-Powered Keying. Attacks on Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are on the rise, and so are cases of abusing them [75] . A recent instance relevant to this section involves IBM researchers who have come up with a proof-of-concept on how malware authors can benefit from AI to craft extremely evasive malware [30] . They developed DeepLocker [30] , which encrypts its payload with an encryption key. The crucial difference, though, is that DeepLocker uses AI for the "trigger condition." Using the neural network, DeepLocker produces the key needed to decrypt the payload. This technique leverages the black-box nature of DNN to transform a simple if this, then that condition into a convolutional network. And due to the enormous complexity of neural networks, it becomes virtually impossible to exhaustively enumerate all possible pathways and conditions [29] .
If crafted adroitly, the targeted tactic can be effective against all four types of debuggers.
Detection-Independent.
Unlike the previous category, the aim of which was to detect or infer a debugger's presence or analysis environment, tactics of this category do not rely on the detection of their target system. They do not care whether the system on which they land has a debugger attached to it or not. The malware operates the same way regardless of their target system. We will have a survey on the tactics of this category in the following.
Tactic 1. Control Flow Manipulation.
Through this tactic, malware exploits the implicit flow control mechanism conducted by Windows OS. To implement these techniques, malware authors often rely on callbacks, enumeration functions, thread local storage (TLS), and so forth [40, 119] . There are several noteworthy techniques here and each deserves a brief introduction.
-Thread-Hiding: A simple and effective technique is thread-hiding which, if used, prevents debugging events from reaching debugger. Microsoft has provisioned special APIs to this end [99, 135] . This technique uses the NtSetInformationThread() function to set the field HideThreadFromDebugger() of theETHREAD kernel structure [143] . This is a powerful technique and simple to implement and can be countered by hooking the involving functions.
LockScreen [135] is an instance known to have utilized this technique. -Suspending Threads: A more aggressive way malware might step into is striving to halt the process of the debugger to continue its own execution with little trouble. This technique can be effective against only user-mode debuggers and can be carried out by leveraging SuspendThread() or NtSuspendThread() from ntdll [17] . Suspending threads is one of the anti-debugging techniques that Kronos banking malware used in its arsenal [52] . -Multi-Threading: Another technique to bypass debuggers and continue the execution is multi-threading. One way to implement this tactic is utilizing the CreateThread() API. A malware that is packed often spawns a separate thread within their process to perform the decryption routines [143] . However, there are instances where malware executes a part of its malicious code through a different thread outside the debugger. McRat [132] and Vertexnet [28] have incorporated such a technique. Countering this technique is tricky. One way is to set breakpoints at every entry point [39, 93] . -Self-Debugging: Self-debugging is an interesting technique which prevents the debugger from successfully attaching to the malware [140] . By default, each process can be attached to merely one debugger. Malware such as ZeroAccess [128] exploits this by running a copy of itself and attaches to it as a debugger. Hence preventing another debugger to own it. There are several ways to implement this tactic: for instance, by leveraging DbgUiDebugAc-tiveProcess() or NtDebugActiveProcess().
Collectively, control-flow manipulation techniques are not very common among the samples we have observed.
Tactic 2. Lockout Evasion.
In Lockout tactic, malware continues its execution by impeding with the working of the debugger without having to look for its presence. One way is to opt for the BlockInput() function as in the case of Satan RaaS [129], through which malware prevents mouse and keyboard inputs until its conditions are satisfied. Other techniques involve exploiting a feature in Windows NT-based platforms that allow the existence of multiple desktops. Malware such as LockScreen [135] , with the help of CreateDesktop() followed by SwitchDesktop(), can select a different active desktop and continue its working unbeknownst to the debugger [39] . This tactic is mostly effective against traditional debuggers. Tactic 3. Fileless Malware. Fileless malware, non-malware, and occasionally called Advanced Volatile Threats (AVTs), are among the latest trend in the evolution of malware [105, 118] . In contrast to all prior existence of malware, fileless malware requires no file to operate and they purely reside in memory and take advantage of existing system tools, e.g., PowerShell [80] .
The purpose of such attacks is to make the forensics much harder. To analyze malware is to analyze its executable; and in fileless malware, there is no executable to begin with. In some cases such as SamSam [78] , the only way to just retrieve a sample for analysis would be to catch the attack taking place live. These attacks inherently are not easy to conduct; but, with the help of exploit-kits are more readily available. A 2018 report by McAfee shows a 432% increase of fileless malware in 2017 [9] and projected to constitute 35% of attacks in 2018 [109] . Fileless tactic falls effective against all four types of debuggers.
With the aid of debuggers, the analyst can overcome many hurdles and limitations of static analysis. However, new trends and real-world scenarios in which the vendors face thousands of new malware samples daily demands a more agile approach-beyond the capabilities of manual dynamic analysis. In the next section, we discuss the emergence of automated dynamic analysis approach and Sandboxes as a response to these challenges and will further elaborate on malware's tactics to thwart them. Table 1 summarizes our survey of manual dynamic evasion techniques.
A Discussion
In Table 1 , we summarize our survey on malware manual dynamic analysis evasion. In this table, we compare the techniques based on four criteria, i.e., complexity of implementation, resistance against manual dynamic analysis, pervasiveness, and efficacy level. In addition, in the example column, we provide malware samples that incorporate the corresponding techniques.
Manual dynamic analysis evasion or anti-debugging is as old as the existence of software. What we have observed in the last decade, attest that incorporation of anti-debugging is prevalent and has been steadily increasing. Authors in [22] demonstrate that on average, more than 70% of malware samples utilize anti-debugging techniques. The majority of these techniques are the ones we have covered in this section. In addition, we have noticed that besides the very pervasive techniques such as IsDebuggerPresent, malware are also employing more timing-based techniques. On the defensive side, we note two major approaches. First is the reactive approach which tries to equip the debugger with counter evasion with respect to any evasion vector such as [119, 133] . Second are endeavors focused on building more transparent analysis systems such as Ether, Hy-perDBG, and MALT [38, 148] . These methods significantly raise the bar for the traditional fingerprinting tactic. But, the more novel and advanced targeted techniques can foil their efforts.
Another emerging trend in malware industry is fileless malware. Such malware as in the case of Rozena [45] leverages exploits to execute malicious commands right from the memory. Given the difficulties of acquiring samples in post-infection phase, perhaps we can conclude that fileless (AVT) tactics along with the targeted, are the most effective manual dynamic analysis evasion tactics.
AUTOMATED DYNAMIC ANALYSIS EVASION
Although effective, the manual dynamic analysis suffers a critical limitation, that is, time. 2018 statistics provided by McAfee reports on receiving more than 600K new samples each day [68] . Analyzing this massive number of malware samples calls for a far more agile approach. This demand led to a new paradigm of analysis which we referred to as automated dynamic analysis. Sandbox is the representative technology for this paradigm. In this section, we will have a brief introduction to sandboxes and further propose a classification and comparison of malware evasion tactics.
An Overview of Malware Sandboxes
The concept behind a malware automated dynamic analysis system is to capture the suspicious program in a controlled and contained testing environment called sandbox, where its behavior in runtime can be closely studied and analyzed. Initially, sandboxes were employed as a part of the manual malware analysis. But today, they are playing their roles as the core of the automated detection process [66] . Sandboxes are built in different ways. To better grasp the evasion tactics, and depict how they stand against different sandbox technologies, first, we must have a sense of how they are made. Goldberg [47] , is "an efficient, isolated duplicate of the real machine." The hypervisor or virtual machine manager (VMM) is in charge of managing and mediating programs' access requests to the underlying hardware. In other words, every virtual machine atop the VMM, in order to access the hardware, must first pass through the hypervisor. There are a couple of ways to implement sandboxes based on virtualization. One way is to weave the analysis tools directly into the hypervisor as in the case of Ether [31] . The other approach would be to embed the analysis tools (e.g., installing hooks) within the virtual machine that runs the malware sample. Instances of this design are Norman sandbox [101] , CWsandbox [137] , and more recently Cuckoo sandbox [49] . Both of the methods inherently leak subtle cues which malware could pick on to detect the presence of a sandbox. In the latter case, for instance, the VMM has to provide the required information to the analysis VM, which means whenever a sensitive system call is being made by the malware, the VMM has to pass the control to the analysis tools inside the VM. Challenges of performing these procedures without leakage are profound, which we will elaborate accordingly.
Virtualization-Based Sandboxes. A virtual machine (VM) according to

Emulation-Based
Sandboxes. An emulator is a software that simulates a functionality or a piece of hardware [35] . An emulation-based sandbox can be achieved through different designs. One would be to simulate the necessary OS functions and APIs. Another approach is the simulation of CPU and memory and is the case for many anti-virus products [35] . Simulation of I/O in addition to memory and CPU is what in literature is referred to as the full system simulation. QEMU [12] is a widely famous full system simulation based on which other famous sandboxes such as Anubis [10] are built. Among the eminent features of emulation-based sandboxes are the great flexibility and detailed visibility of malware inner workings (introspection) that they offer. Especially with the full system emulation, the behavior of the program under inspection (PUI) could be studied with minute details.
Bare-Metal Sandboxes.
Recently evolved and perplexing evasion tactics, employed by sophisticated malware, demand a new paradigm of analysis. The emerging idea is to execute the malware in several different analysis environments simultaneously with the assumption that any deviation in behavior is a potential indication of malicious intent [63] . The feasibility of this idea requires a reference system in which the malware is analyzed without the utilization of any detectable component, and the ideal choice would be a bare-metal environment equal to a real production system in terms of transparency. There have been several products in this vein (e.g., Barebox, bare cloud [62, 63, 138] ). Along with the merits that each design offers, there are subtle flaws or specific working principles that malware exploits to forge their evasion tactic.
Proposed Classification of Automated Dynamic Analysis Evasion Techniques
If the malware achieves one specific goal, it can triumphantly evade the sandbox. This goal is to behave nicely or refrain from executing its malicious payload so long as it resides within the sandbox. This strategy capitalizes on two facts. The first is that due to a massive number of malware samples and limitation of resources, sandboxes allot a specific limited time to the analysis of a sample. The second stems from an inherent limitation of dynamic analysis. In dynamic analysis, since the "runtime behavior" and "execution" are being inspected, only the execution path is visible to the inspector (sandbox). Thus, if a malware portrays no malevolent behavior while under examination, the sandbox flags it as benign.
Similar to manual dynamic analysis evasion, we propose to classify automated dynamic analysis evasion tactics under two categories, i.e., detection-dependent evasion and detection-independent evasion. We will elaborate on these tactics along with several techniques under each tactic. In addition, we briefly note the ways through which sandboxes try to defeat these tactics. To provide a more coherent overview of these evasion techniques, we employ the three following criteria which would serve as the basis for our comparison and we summarize our findings in Table 2 .
-Complexity: The difficulty of implementing an evasion tactic. Our touchstones for evaluating complexity are lines of code (LOC), and more importantly the challenges which differ per tactic. -Pervasiveness: This criterion captures the relative prevalence of a particular tactic. Based on our observations or security reports [68, 85] , we try to provide a relative prevalence for each tactic. -Efficacy Level: Each tactic has an efficacy level. This demonstrates against which type of sandbox that particular tactic is effective.
Detection-Dependent Evasion.
Similar to the corresponding category of evasion in the manual analysis evasion, the main goal of the malware is to detect its environment to verify whether the host is a sandbox or not. A successful evasion in this category is subjected to correctly detecting the environment. If the environment is detected to be a sandbox, or that it is not the intended environment, the malware will not reveal its malicious payload, hence, evades the detection. Following are the tactics a malware might use to achieve this. Tactic 1. Fingerprinting. Fingerprinting is a tactic pursued by malware to detect the presence of sandboxes by looking for environmental artifacts or signs that could reveal the indications of a virtual/emulated machine. These signs can range from device drivers, overt files on disk and registry keys, to discrepancies emulated/virtualized processors. Indications of VM or emulation are scattered at different levels [51, 59, 69, 112] . It is noteworthy to mention that initially, many sandboxes such as Norman [101] were developed upon VMs. Thus, in literature, you may still observe the terms sandbox and VMs being used interchangeably to imply a contained analysis Low environment. The very same fact is also the reason for the advent of techniques referred to as anti-VM, suggesting that detection of a virtual machine would potentially mean an analysis environment. Different studies have been conducted to uncover the levels at which sandboxes leave their marks [24, 144] . These levels are as follows:
-Hardware: Devices and drivers are overt artifacts that malware might look for to identify its environment. In the case of devices, VMs often emulate devices that can be readily detected as in the case of Reptile malware [2] . This ranges from obvious footprints such as the VMWare Ethernet device with its identifiable manufacturer prefix, to more subtle marks. Moreover, specific drivers are employed by VMs to interact properly with the host OS. These drivers are other indications of an analysis environment for malware. For instance, in the path C:\Windows\System32\Drivers exist such signs that could expose VMWare, Virtual-Box, and so forth (e.g., Vmmouse.sys, vm3dgl.dll, VMToolsHook.dll) [4] . -Execution Environment: A malware inside sandbox experiences subtle differences in the environment within which they are executed. Kernel space memory values, for instance, are different between a sandbox and native system that can be detected by malware as in the cases of Agobot and Storm Trojans [124, 127] . Artifacts of this level manifest themselves either in memory or execution. As in the case of memory artifacts, for instance, to allow inspection and control between host and guest OS, VMWare creates a channel between them ("ComCHannel"). Virtual PC hooks work in the same way [67] . Anticuckoo [34] , for instance, detects and crashes the cuckoo sandbox through detecting and manipulating the system hooks. -Application: When an analysis application is used in an environment, its presence is usually disclosed due to the artifacts of installation and execution which can be picked up by inquisitive malware such as Rbot [88], Phatbot [87], [139] , or [65] . Even if not executed, evidence of the analysis tools might be residing on the disc, registry keys, and so forth, which could be readily found by malware, especially if they contain a well-known file name or locations, e.g., SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\VirtualDeviceDrivers. In a similar instance, if the names are not altered or the corresponding processes concealed, they can be enumerated by malware with little trouble. For instance, VMtools.exe, Vmwareuser.exe, or vboxservice.exe if queried by malware, are vivid indicators of a virtual machine and analysis environment. -Behavior: Perhaps, the most troublesome of all, for anti-malware vendors to conceal, are the leakages caused by imperfect virtualization/emulation, or characteristics that are innate to such environments. Of particular interest are discrepancies of behavior between an emulated CPU and a physical one [112] . Performance of an application running under emulation is inferior to a real system. This performance penalty stems from translations or interceptions that have to be carried out in an emulation/virtualization. Such discrepancies can be disclosed through a diverse set of timing attacks [41, 44, 106] . Computing absolute performance for fingerprinting is an arduous task due to the diversity of hardware configuration.
An alternative for malware is to calculate the relative performance [112] . Pursuing this method, malware compares the performance ratio of two or more operations on the same system. If the measurement varies significantly among production and emulation systems, there's a high chance of sandbox presence. Another interesting way of exploiting the limitations of emulation is observing and comparing the effects of caching on emulated and real environments. In this technique, a function is executed a number of times. As expected, the first run must be the slowest. The same test is performed again, this time, in the absence of caching. Timing analysis depicts the effectiveness of the employed caching. Simulation of processor cache is a complex task and emulators may not support it, the result of which is exposure of emulation in the aforementioned test [112] . Another noteworthy set of techniques are the red pill tests [104] . An inevitable behavioral artifact sandboxes share, are the imperfect simulation of CPU and residing instruction bugs. If a malware specifically finds such bugs and if during the execution it notices a mishandled instruction, it will suspect the presence of the sandbox.
-Network: In addition to the previous levels that were suggested by Chen et al. [24] , malware can also probe the network in pursuit of sandbox's marks. These marks are manifested in many forms such as known fixed IP addresses [145] , limitations pertaining to the sandboxes that prevent or emulate the internet access [15, 125] , or extremely fast internet connection [33] . One technique, for instance, proposed in [145] , is detecting sandboxes based on their known IP addresss, which is acquired in an earlier attack through a decoy malware.
Fingerprinting tactic was the initial endeavor of malware authors to detect and evade sandboxes, and as we observed the techniques have evolved significantly. In countering fingerprinting, most solutions are reactive, namely, the fingerprinting technique must first be disclosed, then the corresponding counter evasion will be provisioned. A sound offensive way of fighting against fingerprinting are endeavors such as Jing et al.'s Morpheus. Morpheus is a tool that automatically finds fingerprints on QEMU and VirtualbBox-based emulators [21] . Collectively, the fingerprinting tactic is still the dominant approach to detect and evade sandboxes [85] .
Tactic 2. Reverse Turing Test.
The second tactic that aims at detection, is checking for human interaction with the system. This tactic capitalizes on the fact that sandboxes are automated machines with no human or operator directly interacting with them. Thus, if malware does not observe any human interaction, it presumes to be in a sandbox. Such tactic is referred to as Reverse Turing Test since a machine is trying to distinguish between human or AI. This tactic can be carried out through various techniques [33, 37, 59, 122, 142] . For instance, the UpClicker [142] or a more advanced one, BaneChant [53] , await the mouse left-click to detect human interaction [116] . In a large portion of reverse Turing test techniques, the malware looks for last user's inputs. To do so, malware often leverages a combination of GetTickCount() and GetLastInputInfo() functions to compute the idle time of the user. To test whether it is running on a real system, the malware waits indefinitely for any form of user input. On a real system, eventually a key would be pressed or mouse would be moved by the user. If that occurs for a specific number of times, malware executes its malicious payload. To counter this tactic of evasion, simulating human behavior might seem intuitive but it might be counterproductive. One reason is that digitally generated human behavior can also be detected [123] . The second reason is that limitation of designing such reversal Turing test seems to be merely a function of imagination. To demonstrate our point, consider another technique in which the malware waits for the user to scroll to the second page of a Rich Text Format (RTF) before it executes the malicious payload; or in another approach, using Windows function GetCursorPos(), which holds the position of the system's cursor, the malware checks the cursor movement speed between instructions; if it exceeds a specific threshold, it would imply that the movement is too fast to be human-generated and malware ceases to operate [116] ; or another more recent technique which relies on seeking wear and tear signs of a production system [92] . The seemingly endless possibilities for designing reversal Turing tests make it a puzzling challenge for sandboxes to counter. This tactic is becoming more prevalent, but still not as pervasive as fingerprinting [85] .
Tactic 3. Targeted. The third tactic of the detection-dependent category is targeted detection. This tactic is slightly different from the previous ones in that instead of striving for detecting or evading a sandbox directly, the malware fingerprints the environment to verify if the host is precisely the intended (targeted) machine. In other words, the malware looks for its target, not sandbox. This tactic can be employed following different routes.
-Environmentally Targeted: Stuxnet is known to be the first Cyber weapon that incorporated targeting tactic as a portion of its evasion tactics [37] . Stuxnet explicitly looked for the presence of a specific industrial control system and would remain dormant otherwise. Depending on the infection approach, APT attacks follow different routes. -Individually Targeted: In the case of Stuxnet, the strategy was to keep probing victims (a wormy behavior) until the target was reached. Other classes of APT include the attacks such as darkhotel [48] , in which the infection is conducted through spear phishing (i.e., directly aimed at the target). In other words, the attackers make sure that their malicious code is directly delivered to their target. -Environment-Dependent Encryption: Such targeted malware have an encrypted payload, the decryption of which is subjected to a key that is derived from its victim's environment. The key might be a hardware serial number, specific environmental settings, and so forth. You can refer to [94] for a thorough discussion of the topic.
Detection-Independent Evasion.
The major difference of this category of tactics is that they do not rely on detecting the target environment, and their evasion tactic is independent of target system, which relieves them from having to employ sophisticated detection techniques. Consequently, efforts directed at achieving more transparency have no effect on these tactics. In the following, we elaborate on the tactics of this category and several techniques to deploy them. Tactic 1. Stalling. This tactic of analysis evasion capitalizes on the fact that sandboxes allot a limited amount of time to the analysis of each sample. Malware has to simply postpone its malicious activity to the post-analysis stage [64] . To this end, malware authors have come up with the idea of stalling [67] , which can be achieved through a diverse set of techniques that range from a simple call to sleep() function to more sophisticated ones. Here we examine some of the known major stalling techniques.
-Simple Sleep: Sleeping is the simplest form of stalling and just as simple to defeat. The idea was to remain inactive for n minutes in order for the sandbox inspection to timeout before observing any malicious activity. After being released to the network, the malware would execute the malicious payload. The infamous DUQU [14] exhibits such technique as one of its prerequisites for ignition. It requires that the system remain idle for at least 10 minutes [117] . Another example would be the Khelios botnet [79] . A new variant of the Khelios sample found in 2013 (Called Nap) calls the SleepEx() API with a timeout of 10 minutes. This delay in execution outruns the sandbox analysis timeout, which is followed by achieving the harmless flag. To counter such techniques, sandboxes came up with the simple idea of accelerating the time (called sleep patching). Although seemingly logical, sleep patching has unpredicted effects. An interesting side effect of sleep patching was observed in specific malware samples where the acceleration actually leads to inactivity of malware instances that wait for human interaction within a predefined period of time [123] . Despite its side effects, sleep patching turned out to be effective in some cases and malware authors came up with more advanced techniques as a response. -Advanced Sleep: New malware instances such as Pafish [77] were found to opt for more advanced sleeping tricks. They detect sleep-patching using the rdtsc instruction in combination with Sleep() to check the acceleration of execution. -Code Stalling: While the sleeps delay the execution, in code stalling the malware opts for executing irrelevant and time-consuming benign instructions to avoid raising any suspicions from the sandbox [123] . Rombertik [13] is a spyware aimed at stealing confidential data. To confuse sandboxes, it writes approximately 960 million bytes of random data to memory. The hurdles this technique impose on sandboxes are twofold. The first one is the inability of the sandbox to suspect stalling as the sample is running actively. The second one is that this excessive writing would overwhelm the tracking tools [13] . In another striking code stalling technique, the malware encrypts the payload using a weak encryption key and brute-forces it during the execution [63] .
Tactic 2. Trigger-Based. The second tactic that does not rely on detection is a trigger-based tactic, or more traditionally logic bombs. As we have already noted, the basis of evading sandboxes is to simply refrain from exhibiting the malicious behavior so long as they are in the sandbox. Another tactic for remaining dormant would be to wait for a trigger. There are many environmental variables that can serve as malware triggers ranging from system date to a specially crafted network instruction. For instance, MyDoom [84] is triggered on specific dates and performs DDoS attacks, or some key-loggers only log keystrokes for particular websites; and finally, DDoS zombies, which are only activated when given the proper command [8] . In the literature, this behavior is referred to as trigger-based behavior [20] . In the following, there are a number of triggers embedded within malware as a protection layer against sandboxes.
-Keystroke-Based: The malware gets triggered if it notices a specific keyword, for instance, the name of an app or the title of a window [114] . What occurs when the trigger happens, depends on the purpose and context. For example, malware might initiate logging keystrokes. -System Time: In this case, the system date or time would serve as the trigger [83, 114, 126] .
A newer malware that recently used this technique was the industroyer [25] . -Network Inputs: A portion of malware are triggered when they receive certain inputs from the network as in the case of Tribal flood network [17] . -Covert Trigger-Based: Previous techniques often presuppose lack of code inspection to remain undetected (as is often the case for compiled malware). However, there have been advances regarding the automatic detection of such program routes, e.g., state-of-the-art covert trigger-based techniques are being devised as a response to automated approaches that aim at detecting such triggers instruction. These techniques utilize instruction-level stenography to hide the malicious code from the disassemblers. In addition, they implement trigger-based bugs to provision stealthy control transfer, which makes it difficult for dynamic analysis to discover proper triggers [37] ; return values from system calls are other instances of malware triggers.
When initially seen in the wild, trigger-based tactics were not utilized to evade sandboxes. They are still relatively seen in the wild and are enhanced to circumvent sandboxes. Finding these triggers is often pursued through path exploration approaches, e.g., symbolic execution with the goal of finding and traversing all the conditional branches in an automated manner. These approaches require significant levels of resources and are still below a fair level of efficiency. Tactic 3. Fileless Malware. In Section 3.2.2, we discussed fileless malware. In addition to the rigorous resistance against manual analysis, fileless malware is profoundly adept at evading security mechanisms. A major difference of this tactic is that most often the malware is not subjected to the analysis environment in the first place. This is an inherent outcome of this tactic. The techniques that fileless malware utilizes are similar to drive-by attacks [71] . Generally, fileless malware exploits a vulnerability of the target system (OS, Browser, Browser plugins, etc.) and injects its malicious code directly into the memory. The new trend of fileless malware uses windows PowerShell to carry out its task. As mentioned earlier, this attack is on the rise, and defending against it is of great complexity.
A Brief Survey on Countering Malware Evasion
Countering evasive malware can follow different tactics. In this section, we briefly survey such defensive tactics against evasive malware. Table 3 summarizes our survey on countermeasure tactics against evasive malware.
Reactive Detection.
In reactive detection, defenders tap into their knowledge of specific evasive behaviors to craft their countermeasure accordingly. Namely, the detection is subjected to knowing the evasion technique in advance. Lau et al. [69] pioneered this approach by devising DSD-TRACER which was later followed by other works such as [18] . In [18] , for instance, Brengel et al. look for excessive usage of rdtsc and CPUID, which are utilized by malware such as Industroyer [25] to conduct timing attacks for fingerprinting and evasion. Reactive approach could circumvent only the known tactics and is vulnerable to novel evasion techniques. They are relatively easy to implement.
Multi-System Execution.
In [21] , the authors define the Multi-System Execution as a major counter evasion tactic. In this approach, malware is executed on several different analysis platforms. Their execution then is studied to determine if their behavior has been diverged based on the execution environment. In [6] , for instance, Balzarotti et al., using a kernel driver, compare the system calls made in different environments to detect the divergence. In a similar tactic, Kirat and Vigna introduced MALGENE [61] in which they utilize a DNA protein alignment algorithm, to devise a new system called trace alignment technique. They executed 2,810 evasive malware in Anubis and Ether and managed to automatically generate evasion signatures (a combination of user API and system call events), and group them into 78 similar evasion techniques. There have been other proposals such as [58, 63, 74] that embody the multi-system execution tactic. Manifesting different behavior in different environments is the characteristic of a detection-dependent strategy. Thus, multi-system execution tactic is only effective against detection-dependent evasion strategy. [20, 108] converges the focus on triggering as many conditional branches as possible in a program in order to provide a more thorough code coverage. The goal is to trigger the malicious payload and expose the malware. In [95] , authors use the path-exploration tactic to identify the detection-dependent malware. Another seminal work under this tactic is Brumley et al.'s [20] MineSweeper in which they use symbolic and concrete execution to solve input values that trigger execution down each path.
Although the path-exploration tactic might seem to be the holy grail of exposing evasive malware, we must note that malware authors have weapons in their arsenal to combat them. For instance, malware authors can incorporate anti-symbolic execution obfuscation [7] into their code and impede with the path-exploration tactic. Or, the solver may fall into a corrupted path leading to crashes.
Toward Perfect Transparency.
Research efforts for finding solutions to counter evasive malware, by a drastically wide margin, are focused on achieving more transparent systems. Transparent analysis systems, in effect, are a direct response to the proliferation fingerprinting tactic. We point out several key approaches to achieve transparency and hiding analysis systems from the prying eyes of malware.
-Hiding Environmental Artifacts: CWSandbox [137] was an early work on automated malware analysis which is based on VMWare. To prevent malware from detecting the analysis environment, authors instrument the system with rootkit-like functionality to cover the environmental artifacts (e.g., files, registry entries). -Hypervisor-Based Analysis: Given the higher privilege in hypervisors, researchers have proposed to take their instrumentation of the system into the hypervisor itself. As noted earlier, authors in [31] proposed ether in which the activity of malware is monitored by catching context switches and system calls using Xen. However, in [106] the authors showed that this system is still vulnerable to fingerprinting tactic. The bare-metal analysis approach is the most idealistic endeavor which targets perfect transparency. In BareCloud [63] , for instance, authors refrain from incorporating in-system monitoring tools. Rather, they rely on analyzing disc and network activity at the hardware level. They achieve a high level of transparency. However, at the cost of introspection. If a malware opts for a stalling tactic, for instance, BareCloud would fail to detect the suspicious activity. Recently, the new trend of making a bare-metal system seems to be concerning the incorporation of system management mode (SMM). Specifically, several traits of SMM make them lucrative choices for building bare-metal systems including full access to system memory, inability to be modified once initialized, and blazing fast speed [149] . In [149] , the authors introduce Spectre for transparent malware analysis. Zhang et al. further employed this technique to introduce MALT-a transparent debugger.
Discussion
In Table 2 , we summarized our survey on malware automated dynamic analysis evasion. In this table, we compared the techniques based on four criteria, i.e., complexity of implementation, pervasiveness, efficacy level, and detection complexity. In addition, in the example column, we provided malware samples that incorporate the corresponding techniques. Moreover, under Sandbox countermeasure tactics, we hint on how the defensive side strives to counter the evasion tactics and how complex/effective these countermeasures are.
In this section, we provided our survey and classification on malware automated dynamic analysis evasion. Our observations, in line with studies such as [22, 85, 103] , notes several trends.
Fingerprinting by far is the most pervasive tactic and has proven to be an effective technique if executed with precision. Aside from other researches and our observations, another proof regarding the dominance of fingerprinting tactic is the trend of defensive research in the last decade and how they are evolving [20, 31, 62, 63, 72, 95, 100, 115, 125, 133, 141, [147] [148] [149] . Examining these researches we observe that the great majority of them are pursuing more transparent systems, the reason of which is to be more resilient against fingerprinting and more broadly, detectiondependent tactics.
We see two reasons behind the pervasiveness of fingerprinting tactic. The first reason is the immensity of possibilities for fingerprinting scenarios. In each level of the system (hardware, application, network, etc.) there are always new hints of identity that malware can look for.
The second reason is the countermeasure strategies against the fingerprinting tactic. As we noted in the previous section, there are two major strategies in this regard. The first one is the reactive approach. Namely, for the sandbox to neutralize malware attempts directed at fingerprinting, it has to know what constitutes fingerprinting in the first place. The second strategy is to aim for more transparent systems either following the approach of single-stand analysis systems, e.g., [31] or heterogeneous analysis, i.e., bare-metal analysis [62, 63] . In retrospect to the cases we cited in this section, we know that both strategies are still vulnerable to zero-day fingerprinting techniques.
Another challenge of transparent systems is the reverse Turing test tactic employed by malware which virtually foils most of the efforts. Reverse Turing test tactic again, forces the defenders to defend with the reactive approach.
On the other hand, we are noticing new trends of malware attack employing detectionindependent tactics. Most notably, stalling [103] and fileless tactics [9] . The majority of the efforts that have been put into developing more transparent systems, has raised the bar for detectiondependent tactics. That is one reason that has motivated malware authors to adopt more detectionindependent tactics.
Unbound fingerprinting possibilities, reactive approaches, the vulnerability of transparent systems to zero-day detection-dependent tactics (fingerprinting, targeted, reverse Turing), and vulnerability of transparency-seeking strategies to detection-independent tactics, all seem to call for more generic and effective defensive strategies.
A promising approach that can potentially counter most of the evasion tactics is path exploration techniques. Every malware will expose its malicious payload if its specific conditions are satisfied. Path exploration techniques potentially can trigger those conditions and expose the malicious behavior. This promising approach, however, is also being shadowed by the emergence of AI-Based malware, which instead of a single if-then condition, uses a complex neural network.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this article, we conducted a survey on the subject of malware analysis evasion techniques and proposed classifications for both modes of manual and automated analysis.
We defined two major categories of evasion for both manual and automated analysis: detectiondependent and detection-independent. On the defensive side, defenders are pursuing four major strategies. Reactive approaches, more transparent analysis systems, bare-metal analysis, and several endeavors toward more generic approaches, namely, path exploration; the latter of which mostly concerns evasion tactics tailored to automated dynamic analysis evasion. The first three defensive strategies can hope for being effective merely against detection-dependent evasion tactics and lose their effectiveness against detection-independent tactics. As for the detectionindependent tactic, we need more generic approaches such as the path exploration methods.
Parallel to endeavors toward path exploration methods, we advocate automated fingerprinting generations such as MORPHEUS [55] and Red Pills [104] . These solutions would not be a generic response, but they would significantly raise the bar for malware pursuing fingerprinting tactic.
Another line of inquiry that we suggest is analyzing the effectiveness of using malware evasion tactics against itself; for the case of detection-dependent tactics, a malware strives relentlessly to detect a sandbox and refrain from execution. What would be the result of a program installed on a production system that would impersonate a sandbox? How efficacious would it be in deterring malware, and if executed adroitly, and how significantly would such approach raise the bar for devising future evasion attempts?
